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THE SCHOLAR
"[I]n suits involving the parent-child relationship, we have more than
two interests involved, we have three interests: the mother's inter-
ests, the father's interests, and, of paramount importance, the child's
interests"'
-Justice Wanda McKee Fowler,
Texas Court of Appeals
The divorce rate in the United States stands between 40 and 50 per-
cent.2 As a result, children are often caught in the crossfire as litigation
over child custody ensues.3 Generally, child custody litigation involves
parents who seek to establish that they should be awarded primary cus-
tody of their children.4 During such litigation, courts must entertain the
competing interests of all parties involved; however, courts have repeat-
edly stated that the best interest of the child is the paramount
consideration.
5
As is often the nature of child custody litigation, parents go about per-
suading the court that they should receive primary custody of their child,
while the child remains voiceless in the matter.6 In order to provide a
voice for the child, courts assume the role of parens patriae, defined as a
"provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves." 7 Acting
1. Lowe v. Lowe, 971 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet.
denied) (quoting the Honorable Justice Wanda McKee Fowler of the Texas Court of
Appeals).
2. Americans for Divorce Reform, Divorce Statistics Collection: Summary of Findings
so Far, at http://www.divorcereform.org/results.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
3. See Judith S. Wallerstein et al., The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: A 25 Year
Landmark Study, in D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 803 (2d ed. 2002) (recognizing the effects of divorce on
children).
4. Litigation is generally between parents because the basic presumption, common to
most courts, is that a child's best interest is served by awarding custody to one of the
natural parents. See In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex. 2000); In re K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d
392, 395 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); McGowen v. State, 558
S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ. ref'd n.r.e.).
5. See Sellers v. Sellers, 638 So. 2d 481, 485 (Miss. 1994); McDaniels v. Carlson, 738
P.2d 254, 262 (Wash. 1987); Tetreault v. Tetreault, 55 P.3d 845, 851 (Haw. 2002); Johnson v.
Murray, 648 N.W.2d 664, 672 (Minn. 2002).
6. Generally, children are not allowed to express their wishes to the court with re-
gards to their choice of custodian until they reach a certain age. In Texas, children twelve
years or older can choose the custodial parent, however, this decision is subject to court
approval, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.008-153.009 (Vernon 2002) amended by Act of
June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S. Ch. 1036.
7. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 911 (7th ed. 2000). See also C. Gail Vasterling, Note,
Child Custody Modification Under the Marriage and Divorce Act: A Statute to End the Tug-
of-War?, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 923, 923-24 (1989) (stating that the future and best parent to
raise the child must be decided by a trial court judge).
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within this capacity, courts then perform the function of determining
what is in the child's best interest.8
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate the manner with which the
"best interest of the child" theory is implemented in child custody cases.
9
More specifically, this comment will focus on the "best interest of the
child" standard, commonly referred to as the Holley factors, applied in
Texas child custody cases.1" Additionally, this comment will explore
whether the current best interest standard in Texas is appropriate in a
child custody context or whether a new standard should be considered.
In order to set a proper perspective from which to evaluate the Texas
best interest standard, Part I of the comment reviews the historical back-
ground and evolution of various child custody standards adopted by
courts. Part II considers and evaluates the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act's "best interest" standard. Part III analyzes the Holley ap-
proach taken by Texas courts, and discusses its inherent flaws. Part IV
evaluates Holley in light of other considerations such as race, religion,
and sexual preference. Part V evaluates recently proposed custody deter-
mination standards, and Part VI recommends changes in the manner
Texas courts apply the best interest standard to child custody disputes.
I. HISTORY
A. Paternal Preference
The evolution of the "best interest" standard begins with the paternal
preference at common law. At common law, the father had an absolute
right to custody of his children.11 This right, known as the paternal pref-
erence rule, has its roots in the dominant thought of that era.12 As head
of the household, the father was responsible for the protection, educa-
8. See Vasterling, supra note 7, at 924 (noting that a judge, pursuant to State statutes,
must consider the "best interests" of the child).
9. The author acknowledges that other child custody standards have been used by the
courts. E.g., Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (discussing the doc-
trine of comparative fitness); see also Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W. Va. 1981)
(discussing the primary caretaker presumption). However, the author has chosen to focus
on the best interest of the child standard in order to conduct a comparative analysis of
Texas child custody law.
10. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976) (enumerating "best inter-
est" factors).
11. See Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1004 (Miss. 1983) (explaining that a
father had an "absolute proprietary right to the custody of his legitimate minor children").
12. Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1981) (discussing that law and nature
mandate that the father have custody of his children); see also Albright, 437 So. 2d at 1004
(noting that the paternal right "was incorporated into the jurisprudence of our country").
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tion, "and religious training of his children".13 As such, the father was
entitled to reap the benefits his children provided.14 The mother, on the
other hand, had no legal rights to the custody of her children. a5 There-
fore, in custody disputes, the father enjoyed an absolute proprietary right
to custody of the children.1 6
B. Tender Years Doctrine
As society's values and beliefs gradually began to change, dominant
thought shifted away from the paternal preference rule in favor of a ma-
ternal presumption, referred to as the tender years doctrine.1 7 The
tender years doctrine created a presumption that the mother should be
awarded custody of young children in cases of divorce or separation. 18
This presumption was rebuttable by establishing that the mother was
unfit.' 9
In 1830, pursuant to Helms v. Franciscus,2 ° Maryland became the first
State in the United States to recognize the tender years doctrine by
stating:
[t]he father is the rightful and legal guardian of all his infant chil-
dren; and in general, no court can take from him the custody and
control of them, thrown upon him by the law, not for his gratifica-
tion, but on account of his duties, and place them against his will in
the hands even of his wife. Yet even a court of common law will not
go so far as to hold nature in contempt, and snatch helpless, pulling
infancy from the bosom of an affectionate mother, and place it in the
coarse hands of the father. The mother is the softest and safest nurse
of infancy, and with her it will be left in opposition to this general
right of the father.21
13. See Devine, 398 So. 2d at 688 (noting that the privileges of the father were "con-
sidered dependent upon the recognized laws of nature and in accordance with the pre-
sumption that the father could best provide for the necessities of his children").
14. See id. (stating that the father was entitled to his children's "services and
association").
15. See id. (noting that at marriage, "husband and wife became one person", her iden-
tity merging completely with the husband); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (not-
ing that man and woman were one, with the man being the representative).
16. Albright, 437 So. 2d at 1004.
17. Id. (discussing that enlightened attitudes gradually began to acknowledge a mater-
nal preference over the common law rule of paternal custody).
18. See Devine, 398 So. 2d at 689 (noting that in England, custody of children less than
seven years old was awarded to the mother).
19. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS 803 (2d ed. 2002).
20. Helms v. Franciscus, 2 G. & J. 544 (Md. 1830).
21. Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
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As such, Helms marks the beginning of the tender years presumption
history in the United States.22 Courts that utilized the doctrine treated it
as either 1) a tie-breaker which required the mother to be awarded cus-
tody upon a showing that all other factors were equal;23 2) a rule which
placed the burden of persuasion upon the father to prove that it was in
the child's best interest to award custody to the father;24 or 3) a rule
which required the father to prove that the mother was unfit in order for
the father to receive custody of their child.25
In the years that followed, the doctrine began to lose support.26 Sev-
eral States declared the doctrine unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 Although States found the doc-
trine unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court never decided
the doctrine's constitutionality. 2 While the doctrine has lost much sup-
port, its legal effect has not been completely abolished because courts
continue to take the child's age into account when determining custody.29
II. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT OF 1970
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("Act") officially gave birth to
the "best interest of the child" theory.3 ° The Act was enacted in 1970 by
22. See Devine, 398 So. 2d. at 689 (discussing the origin of the tender years
presumption).
23. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests
of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody Preferences,
20 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 10 (1985).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979) (stating that a mother does
not necessarily have a closer relationship with her children); Passmore v. Passmore, 820 So.
2d 747, 750 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing a weakening of the tender years doctrine
through the passage of time). See also New York ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285,
290 (NY Fam. Ct. 1973) (citing studies showing that children need "mothering," not neces-
sarily a mother). But see Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So. 2d 943, 947 (Miss. 2001) (stating that
the tender years doctrine is still a factor to be weighed in a best interest of the child
analysis).
27. See Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119-20 (Utah 1986) (stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes a reliance "on gender as a determining factor" in child custody
cases); Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 287 (stating that the tender years presumption violates state
law).
28. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 19, at 803.
29. E.g., Mercier v. Mercier, 717 So. 2d 304, 307 (Miss. 1998); Davidson v. Davidson,
576 N.W.2d 779, 785 (Neb. 1998) (noting that age of a child is a factor to be considered in
determining the child's best interest); Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 109 S.W.3d 653, 663-64
(Ark. 2003) (listing the age of the child as a factor in reaching a best interest
determination).
30. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (2003) (amended
1971, 1973).
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the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for
the purpose of providing guidance to courts adjudicating marriage and
divorce issues.3 Enactment of the Act came upon the heels of the de-
cline of the tender years doctrine.3" During this era, focus shifted from
the interest of the parents to the best interest of the child.3 3
In keeping with prevailing dominant thought, Section 402 of the Act
codified the "best interest of the child" theory.34 Section 402 requires a
court to consider:
1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody, 2)
the wishes of the child as to his custodian, 3) the interactions and
interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings,
and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interest, 4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and commu-
nity, and 5) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved.35
While the Act was consistent with the prevailing thought of the 1970s,
it was not readily adopted by the states. 36 In the years that have fol-
lowed, only a handful of states have adopted the "best interest standard"
as set forth in the Act. 37
The best interest of the child theory under the Act has received much
criticism.38 Some of the criticisms it has received are that the Act's best
interest theory is subject to broad judicial discretion and is indeterminate,
resulting in increased litigation.39 The Act has also been criticized be-
31. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr § 402, 9A U.L.A., Prefatory Note (1987)
(updated 1998). See generally Vasterling, supra note 7, at 936-37 (discussing that some
states look to the UMDA for custody disputes).
32. See Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (1987) (noting that the tender years doctrine was replaced by the best
interest of the child theory during the 1970s).
33. Vasterling, supra note 7, at 924-26 (noting that no-fault divorce statutes and de-
mise of the tender years doctrine shifted the focus to the child). See also 22 AMIUR TRIALS
357 § 4 (1975) (explaining that the spirit of the best interest theory requires that both
parents be accorded equal footing, with neither parent receiving preference).
34. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (2003).
35. See id.
36. Vasterling, supra, note 7, at 936.
37. See id. (noting that very few states "have adopted statutes similar to the UMDA in
terms of initial custody decision").
38. Id. at 926. See generally Elster, supra note 32, at 11-28 (discussing the principle as
indeterminate, unjust, self-defeating and overridden by public interest).
39. See Elster, supra note 32, at 28-29 (arguing that judge's reasoning may be influ-
enced by other factors). See generally Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication:
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 226 (1975)
(discussing judicial functions in child custody law).
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cause it does not prioritize nor give any indication of the weight to be
accorded each factor.4" Nevertheless, the best interest theory under the
Act continues to be a model for States to follow despite the fact that few
States have adopted the Act.
III. TEXAS STANDARD
A. Best Interest of the Child in Texas
Texas statutory and case law reveal that Texas courts' primary consid-
eration in determining child custody is the best interest of the child.4 '
However, Texas has not adopted the Act's "best interest of the child"
standard, nor has Texas codified a list of best interest factors in the Texas
Family Code.42 Rather, the best interest standard in Texas has developed
from factors established by the Texas Supreme Court in Holley v. Ad-
ams,43 a 1976 parental rights termination case.44
In Holley v. Adams, the father, David Adams, filed suit to terminate
his former wife's legal right to a parent-child relationship. 45 The divorce
decree named David Adams as the managing conservator of their child,
40. Carl E. Schneider, Legislature and Legal Change: The Reform of Divorce Law, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1127 (1988) (reviewing HERBERT JACOB, A SILENT REVOLUTION:
ROUTINE POLICY MAKING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES (1988)).
41. In re Marriage of Bertram, 981 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no
pet.); Doyle v. Doyle, 955 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet.); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.002 (Vernon 2002).
42. Bertram, 981 S.W.2d at 822 (explaining that while Texas does not have a codifica-
tion of best interest standards, the Texas Supreme Court has established factors for a court
to consider in determining child custody); In the Interest of T.D.C., Fort Worth Court of
Appeals, 18 TEXAS LAWYER No. 21 (July 29, 2002) (noting that the Texas Family Code does
not define nor list factors to be considered in modification suits). See also TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 263.307 (Vernon 2002) (listing "best interest" factors applicable only to
Chapter 263: Review of Placement of Children Under Care of Department of Protective
and Regulatory Services).
43. 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976).
44. Id. at 371-72. Prior to 1976, Texas had adopted a form of the maternal preference
rule which gave custody of children of tender years to mothers when all things were equal
between the parents. Spitzmiller v. Spitzmiller, 429 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Erwin v. Erwin 505 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ). Eventually the maternal preference rule was
abolished by Act of Jan. 1, 1974, 63d Leg., R.S. ch. 543, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1413
repealed by Act of Apr. 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S. ch. 20, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 282. which
required a court to disregard the sex of either parent in deciding custody. Altamarino v.
Altamarino, 591 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ); Adams v.
Adams, 519 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. Civ. App. -El Paso 1975, no writ). Section 14.01 was
amended in 1995 and is currently TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.003 (Vernon 2002).
45. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 367.
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but did not order his former wife, Nanci Holley, to pay child support.46
Pursuant to Section 15.02 of the Texas Family Code, the trial court termi-
nated the parental rights of Mrs. Holley.47 The grounds for termination
were that Mrs. Holley failed to provide child support; that she engaged in
conduct which "endangered the emotional well-being of the child"; and,
that "terminating the parent-child relationship was in the best interest of
the child."48
The trial court held that while Mrs. Holley was not required to pay
child support pursuant to a court order, she had a duty to do so under
Texas Family Code Section 4.02.4 1 The trial court further held that aban-
donment of her son for almost six years constituted conduct endangering
the "emotional well-being of the child."5° Finally, the trial court con-
cluded that the best interest of the child would be served by terminating
Mrs. Holley's parental rights.5 This holding was predicated on findings
that Mrs. Holley voluntarily left the child with Mr. Adams, unexpectedly
departed to Washington, and remarried two more times.52 The trial court
culminated its analysis by noting that in the span of six years, Mrs. Holley
only saw her child a total of three times during which time she only sent
him about $100.00." 3 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision. 4
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the lower courts' decision to
terminate the parent-child relationship was reversed.55 The Court held
that while Mrs. Holley did not comply with her duty to support her child,
she did not engage in conduct endangering the emotional well-being of
46. See id. at 368.
47. See id. Act of May 24, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 543, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws
1426-7, repealed by Act of Apr. 6, 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 282
provided that:
"[a] petition requesting termination of the parent-child relationship with respect to a
parent who is not the petitioner may be granted if the court finds that: (1) the parent
has: (D) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged
in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child; or (E)
failed to support the child in accordance with his ability during a period of one year
ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition; and (2) termination is
in the best interest of the child."
Section 15.02 was repealed in 1995 and replaced with TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 161.001(1)(E) (Vernon 2002).
48. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 368.
49. Id. at 367.
50. Id. at 368.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 373.
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her child.56 Therefore, the court found that termination of Mrs. Holley's
parental rights was not in the best interest of the child.57
B. Holley Factors
In reaching its best interest determination in Holley, the Texas Su-
preme Court considered several factors applied by other courts when de-
termining the best interest of a child. 8 These factors were then compiled
into a list for Texas courts to consider when evaluating the best interest of
the child.59 The factors set forth in Holley are:
A) the desires of the child; B) the emotional and physical needs of
the child now and in the future; C) the emotional and physical dan-
ger to the child now and in the future; D) the parental abilities of the
individuals seeking custody; E) the programs available to assist these
individuals to promote the best interest of the child; F) the plans for
the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; G)
the stability of the home or proposed placement; H) the acts or omis-
sions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child
relationship is not a proper one; and I) any excuse for the acts or
omissions of the parent.6°
The Texas Supreme Court indicated that this list was not exhaustive
and that the factors were "considerations which either have been or
would appear to be pertinent., 61
C. Problems With Holley
When a court seeks to determine the best interest of the child, the
court possesses both a right and a duty to inquire into all circumstances
relating to a disposition of the child.62 Unfortunately, application of the
Holley factors falls short of this duty by presenting the following basic
flaws: 1) Holley v. Adams was a parental rights termination case, and,
therefore, some of these factors may not be appropriate in a child custody
56. Id. at 371-72.
57. Id. at 373.
58. Id. at 371-72.
59. Id. at 372.
60. Id.
61. Id. It should be noted that only a few of the factors were applicable to Holley. Id.
The factors the court applied were: (1) "acts or omissions of the parent, (2) excuse of acts
or omissions, and (3) the emotional needs of the child." Id.
62. Conley v. St. Jacques, 110 S.W.2d 1238,1242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1937, writ
dism'd w.o.j.).
2003]
THE SCHOLAR
context;63 2) the Holley factors do not consider the parents' wishes,
thereby raising constitutional issues;64 and 3) courts are not required to
address the relevance of each Holley factor.6 1
1. Inappropriate Contexts
First, the Holley factors have been applied, and in some instances mis-
applied, to various legal contexts including modification, 66 parental notifi-
67 6cation, parental rights termination,68  and child custody cases. 9
Whereas the Holley factors may be appropriate for termination of paren-
tal rights proceedings, they cannot practicably be applicable to all custody
related issues.70 This flaw was recently recognized in the dissenting opin-
ion of In re Doe 2,71 where Justice Nathan L. Hecht and Justice Greg
Abbott stated that:72
[t]he Court derives from its opinion in Holley v. Adams, a case involv-
ing the termination of a spouse's parental rights, four factors that trial
63. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72 (noting that only a limited number of factors
were used in resolving the issue).
64. See id. a 372 (omitting the parents' wishes from among the list of factors to be
considered).
65. See In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. 2000) (stating that only four of the
Holley factors are relevant to the parental notification context). See also Reyes v. Lafferty,
No. 04-95-00937-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 15, 1997, no writ) (not designated for
publication), 1997 WL 13607, *2 (stating that not all factors were relevant).
66. See In re T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d 865, 873 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (ap-
plying Holley factors to determine whether modification would be in the child's best inter-
est); see also Turner v. Turner, 47 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no
pet.) (applying Holley factors in a modification suit).
67. See Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d at 297 (applying Holley factors in determining whether it
would be in the child's best interest to bypass parental notification).
68. See In the Interest of C.B. and V.B., No. 01-01-00117-CV (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] July 25, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 1722035, at *4
(applying Holley factors in suit involving parental rights termination); see also Perrett v.
Tex. Dept. Protective and Regulatory Services, No. 03-01-00474-CV (Tex. App.-Austin
2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 1343220, *5, *7 (applying Holley
factors in making determination that "termination of mother and father's parental rights
was in the best interests of their children").
69. See In re Marriage of Bertram, 981 S.W.2d 820, 822-823 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1998, no pet.) (recognizing but not applying the Holley factors because the court was ad-
dressing the presumption that it is in the child's best interest for parents to be appointed
joint managing conservators); see also Reyes, 1997 WL 13607 at *1 (indicating that the
"best interest of the child" standard is used by trial courts in Texas as a guide for determin-
ing who to name as managing conservator).
70. See In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ) (noting
that the applicable standard in termination proceedings is by clear and convincing
evidence).
71. 19 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 2000).
72. Id. at 297 (Hecht & Abbot JJ., dissenting).
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courts should consider in deciding whether parental notification of a mi-
nor's wish to have an abortion is not in the minor's best interest. Any
connection between a termination of parental rights and parental notifi-
cation is not immediately apparent, and the Court does not bother to
explain its rationale. The Court has simply sought out its only prior deci-
sion in any context listing 'best interest' factors and attempted to apply it
here.73
Further support for the proposition that the Holley factors should not
be so readily applied to contexts other than the parental rights termina-
tion context can be illustrated by considering the different rights impli-
cated in the various contexts. 4 For example, the problem with applying
Holley in child custody cases is that the issues in child custody disputes
generally revolve around the allocation of child rearing rights and duties
between the parents.75 Furthermore, the decision by the trial court is
revocable and the court acquires continuing jurisdiction.76 These aspects
make custody cases different from parental notification or parental termi-
nation cases.77 Therefore, it follows that the Holley factors may not be
appropriate for determining the best interest of a child in child custody
cases.
2. Lack of Parental Consideration
Secondly, while the primary focus should be on the best interest of the
child, in order for the standard to be constitutional, parents should be
given an opportunity to have their position regarding their child's best
interest considered.78 In Troxel v. Granville,79 the United States Supreme
Court stated that in determining the best interest of a child, a parent's
wishes should be accorded some weight.8" The Holley factors do not pro-
vide parents this opportunity and run the risk of being held
unconstitutional. 1
73. Id. A review of the Holley factors reveals that while the Texas Supreme Court
purports to have adopted four Holley factors, the fourth factor listed by the court was not
derived from Holley. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976) (listing the
Holley factors, none of which include the fourth factor used in Doe 2).
74. See Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d at 288-89 (comparing rights involved in custody cases with
parental notification cases).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 289.
77. Id..
78. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (identifying the problem of not
taking the parent's decision into consideration when deciding the child's best interest).
79. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
80. Id. at 70.
81. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976) (omitting parents' inter-
est from among the list of factors to be considered).
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Troxel can be distinguished from a child custody case because Troxel
dealt with grandparents seeking visitation rights, rather than custody.82
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the funda-
mental right parents have "to make childrearing decisions."83 Certainly,
decisions by parents as to what is in the best interest of their child and
with whom the child should live are childrearing decisions. As such, they
fall within the parent's fundamental rights and should always be consid-
ered by the courts.
Under Holley, a judge may entertain the parent's views, but is not re-
quired to weigh these views in making a determination of the child's best
interest.84 If a court does not consider parents' views, the United States
Supreme Court noted that the best interest determination would be
placed "solely in the hands of the judge."8 5 Failing to consider parents'
views coupled with wide judicial discretion can lead to a decision that is
not in the best interest of the child.86 In effect, judges' decisions could
reflect their individual beliefs rather than the child's best interest.87 "If
personal values are the measuring device for custody decisions, fault inev-
itably becomes a determinative factor, and the child custody decision fo-
cuses on parental conduct rather than the best interests of the child." 8
8
3. Failure to Address the Relevance of Every Factor
Lastly, Holley does not require the courts to address the relevance, or
lack thereof, of every factor.89 For example, in Reyes v. Lafferty,90 Mr.
Reyes appealed his appointment as possessory conservator of his son.91
An ad litem report containing a recommendation of the child's best inter-
est had been prepared for the court.92 The report used the Holley factors
82. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
83. Id. at 72-73.
84. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372. Parental views on a child's best interest are not listed
amongst the Holley factors. Id.
85. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
86. Id. at 73 (stating that "[t]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe
on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state
judge believes a 'better' decision could be made.").
87. Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interest of the Child: Reexamining Child
Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment With the Pri-
mary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 444 (1990).
88. Id. at 444-45.
89. See Reyes v. Lafferty, No. 04-95-00937-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no
writ) (not designated for publication), 1997 WL 13607, at *2 (recognizing that not all fac-
tors are relevant in child custody cases).
90. Id. at *1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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in order to determine the child's best interest.93 Reyes argued that the
report did not reveal the best interests of his son because the report failed
to address each of the Holley factors.9 4 The court responded by noting
that the ad litem report listed each factor, but that the report only needed
to address the relevant factors.95 With this rationale, the court found that
the report did not fall "below the minimum standards" 96 in determining
the child's best interest.97
This type of reasoning further perpetuates the subjective nature of the
best interest theory in Texas. Presumably a court could make a determi-
nation as to what is in a child's best interest after only considering one or
two "relevant" factors. Without requiring a court to address each Holley
factor and explain its relevance, or lack thereof, courts fall short of their
duty to protect a child's best interest.
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Holley does not directly address issues such as religion, race, or the
parents' sexual preference.98 Therefore, some discussion regarding these
issues is appropriate in order to determine if Holley is correct in omitting
such issues from consideration.
A. Religion
Courts throughout the United States generally adhere to one of the
following approaches where a parent desires to make religious preference
an issue: 1) allow religion to be a factor, as long as it is not the sole or
dominant factor,99 2) consider how religion impacts the child's well be-
ing,1°° 3) consider religion in cases where the child has an identifiable
religious preference or in cases where religion is an important part of a
child's identity, 10 or 4) refuse to consider religion as a factor. 102
93. Id. at *2.
94. See id. (arguing that the report did not address the child's wishes and did not list
any acts or omissions which indicated that the parent-child relationship was improper).
95. Id.
96. The court explained neither the origins nor the framework of "minimum stan-
dard". See id. at *3.
97. See Id.
98. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976) (omitting race, religion, and
parental sexual preference from amongst the list of factors to be considered).
99. See Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in
Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383, 397-98 (1989) (indi-
cating that though many courts have endorsed religion as a factor, many have taken steps
to minimize the role of religion).
100. See id. 398-99 (explaining how a court's discretion may either seriously hinder
consideration of religion or may place no limit on it at all).
101. Id. at 399.
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As noted above, Holley does not include religion as a factor to be con-
sidered in making a best interest determination 0 3 While Holley is silent
on the issue of religion, one Texas court has directly addressed this is-
sue." The Amarillo Court of Appeals explained that:
[i]t is beyond the power of the court, in awarding the custody of a
child or children to prefer the religious views or teachings of either
parent, even though the beliefs and practices of one parent might be
more 'normal' or more in accord with majority religious views or
practices. 10 5
Although it appears that Texas law is settled with respect to religion
and child custody determinations, such a conclusion may be inconsistent
with the Texas Family Code which provides that a parent who has posses-
sion of the child has "the right to direct the moral and religious training
of the child."10 6 This apparent conflict reveals that Texas law may be
inconsistent with respect to religion and child custody determinations. 10 7
As such, it cannot be determined whether Holley appropriately omits re-
ligion as a factor.
B. Race
As noted previously, Holley does not address what role, if any, race
should play in determining a child's best interest. Furthermore, neither
Texas case law nor the Texas Family Code directly address race in the
custody context, with the exception of the adoption context. 10 8 However,
the Texas Constitution and the United States Supreme Court suggest that
race should not be a factor to be considered when determining the best
interest of the child during a child custody determination. Article I, Sec-
tion 3a of the Texas Constitution states that "[e]quality under the law
shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or na-
tional origin."' 9 A literal reading of this section suggests that in Texas,
102. See In the Matter of the Marriage of Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1987, no writ) (stating that religion is not a factor to be considered).
103. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72 (failing to address religion as a factor).
104. See Knighton, 723 S.W.2d at 274, 278.
105. Id. at 278.
106. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.074(4) (Vernon 2002).
107. See Kelly McClure & Clint Westhoff, Fighting Over Faith: Religious Beliefs and
Practices Play a Role in Custody Litigation, 17 TEXAS LAWYER, No. 22, (August 6, 2001)
(recognizing the apparent conflict between Texas case and statutory law).
108. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.105 (Vernon 2002); In re Adoption of Gomez,
424 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1967, no writ) (finding a Texas statute which
prohibited interracial adoptions as unconstitutional and in violation of Article 3a of the
Texas State Constitution).
109. TEX CONSr. art. I, § 3a.
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race should not be a deciding factor in determining the best interests of a
child.
Further support for the proposition that race should not be a factor in
making a best interest determination is found in the United States Su-
preme Court case, Palmore v. Sidoti." 0 In Palmore, the father sought to
modify an existing judgment granting custody to the mother, on grounds
that the mother was living with a man of another race." 1 The father was
awarded custody by the trial court which reasoned that it was not in the
child's best interest to live in an interracial home. 1 2 This holding was
subsequently affirmed by the appellate court.1 3 The Supreme Court re-
versed the lower courts' decisions explaining that in modification pro-
ceedings, race should not be a factor." 4 Considering the holding in
Palmore, and the language contained in the Texas Constitution, it follows
that Holley appropriately omits race as a factor in best interest
determinations.
C. Sexual Preference
Texas law does not directly address which position Texas courts take
with respect to homosexual parents and child custody. However, at least
one Texas court has allowed a parent's sexual preference to be a factor
when terminating parental rights.'1 5 Other states have dealt with the is-
sue in one of several ways. For example, Mississippi holds that a differ-
ence in "personal values and lifestyles" should not be the "sole basis for
custody decisions." '116 Therefore, in Mississippi, a court is entitled to con-
sider homosexuality as a factor as long as it is not the only factor
considered.1 17
Arkansas follows the view that homosexuality is presumed detrimental
to a child if homosexual conduct takes place in the presence of the
110. 466 U.S. 429, 429 (1984).
111. Id. at 430.
112. Id. at 430.
113. Id.
114. See id. (concluding that possible injury and private biases are not permissible
considerations for removing a child from the mother).
115. See In Interest of McElheney, 705 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985,
no writ) (allowing testimony of a mother's sexual preference to be considered as one factor
among several others).
116. Fulk v. Fulk 2002 WL 31248616 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); see Hollon v. Hollon, 784
So. 2d 943, 949 (Miss. 2001) (stating that a "homosexual relationship is not, per se, a basis
to determine that child custody should be denied").
117. See Morris v. Morris, 783 So. 2d 681, 693 (Miss. 2001) (holding that a court was
justified in considering a mother's homosexual lifestyle amongst other relevant factors).
See also S.B. v. L.W., 793 So. 2d 656, 661 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that the court did
not find any case law requiring that homosexuality be ignored).
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child."'l Similarly, New Mexico allows custody to be denied if a parent's
sexual preference will have an adverse impact upon the child. 119 In tan-
dem with this view, Louisiana holds that when determining a child's best
interest, a court should determine whether the child is being negatively
affected by the homosexual lifestyle of the parent. 120
As discussed above, Texas courts do not directly address the issue of
homosexuality and its impact, or lack thereof, on child custody. Further-
more, the Texas legislature does not provide guidance on the issue.
Therefore, with the lack of case and statutory law on the issue, coupled
with the recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas,1 1 whereby a Texas sodomy
law was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United
States, one may conclude that Holley appropriately omits sexual prefer-
ence as a factor.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE BEST INTEREST STANDARD
With the frequent criticism of the best interest of the child standard,
alternative standards have been proposed. Such standards include the
primary caretaker presumption 12 2 and the past caretaker standard. 12 3
A. Primary Caretaker Standard
Under the primary caretaker standard, there is a presumption that the
best interest of the child is served by placing the child with the parent
who has been the predominant caretaker. 124 In determining which par-
ent is the predominant caretaker, the standard focuses on who provided
118. Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); see Ketron v.
Aguirre, 692 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that the Court has "never con-
doned a parent's promiscuous conduct or lifestyle when such conduct has been in the pres-
ence of the child").
119. A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 664-65 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
120. See Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1995). In making this
determination Louisiana courts consider "1) whether the children were aware of the illicit
relationship, 2) whether sex play occurred in their presence, 3) whether the furtive conduct
was notorious and brought embarrassment to the children, and 4) what effect the conduct
had on the family home life." Id.
121. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (holding that the state could not constitutionally
proscribe the sexual practices common to the homosexual lifestyle engaged in by con-
senting, adult homosexuals in the privacy of their own home).
122. See Vasterling, supra note 7, at 927 n.23 (noting that the primary caretaker stan-
dard is one alternative to the best interest of the child standard).
123. See Robert F. Kelly & Shawn L. Ward, Social Science Research and the American
Law Institute's Approximation Rule, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 350, 352 (2002) (discussing the ra-
tionales in favor of the "approximation rule" as opposed to the best interest standard")
The "approximation rule" is also referred to as the "past caretaker standard." Id. at n.5.
124. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra, note 19 at 805.
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the child's daily needs.125 In Garska v. McCoy,126 the West Virginia Su-
preme Court explained that in determining which parent predominantly
provided for the child's daily needs, a court should consider which parent
was responsible for:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and
dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning and care of clothes; (4) medical
care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for so-
cial interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends'
houses or, for example to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging
alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to
bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking
child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners
and toilet training; (9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.;
and, (10) teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing, and
arithmetic.127
Proponents of the standard emphasize that it is gender neutral, that it
encourages less litigation, and is predictable. 128 Criticism includes that it
is not gender neutral, but merely a return to the tender years doctrine, 29
and that the standard focuses on the parent's conduct rather than on the
child's best interest.130
While the presumption is not currently utilized by any state,'3 the pri-
mary caretaker standard remains viable because several States allow pri-
mary caretaker status to be considered as a factor when determining the
best interest of a child. 132 As for Texas, courts are to consider the par-
ents' participation in child rearing, but only when determining whether to
grant joint custody.133
125. Vasterling, supra, note 7, at 927 n.23 (noting that "the parent who previously
provided the child's daily needs, receives custody"). See also Crippen, supra, note 87, at
439 (explaining that the standard focuses on the "physical care of the child").
126. 278 S.E.2d 357, 357 (W. Va. 1981).
127. Id. at 363.
128. See Vasterling, supra note 7, at 927 n.23.
129. Id. (referring to the maternal preference rule, also known as the tender years
doctrine).
130. Crippen, supra note 87, at 486.
131. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 19, at 805.
132. E.g., Kjelland v. Kjelland, 609 N.W.2d 100, 106 (N.D. 2000); Zuniga v. Zuniga,
664 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ); Rossen v. Rossen, 792
S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
133. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.134(a)(4) (Vernon 2002). E.g., In re Marriage of
Bertram, 981 S.W.2d 820, 824 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.).
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B. Past Caretaking Standard
The American Law Institute (ALI) has also recognized the inherent
problems with the best interest of the child theory.13 4 In response, the
ALI has proposed a past caretaking standard. 135 Under the proposed
standard, physical custody is awarded to each parent consistent with the
amount of time that each parent spent taking care of the child prior to
separation. 136 The focus of this standard is on past caretaking behavior as
opposed to predicted future patterns of behavior under the best interest
of the child theory. 137 Proponents of this standard claim that this ap-
proach will increase predictability in custody disputes because parents
will have a general idea of how much "custody time" they will be
awarded. 38 The benefit realized, according to proponents, is that the
more predictable the outcome, the less likely litigation will occur. 139 Pro-
ponents further claim that the amount of time a parent spends with the
child prior to and after a divorce will remain consistent, thus maintaining
stability in a child's life.14 °
While this standard sounds very much like the primary caretaker pre-
sumption discussed supra, it varies in certain aspects. 41 For example, un-
like the primary carektaker presumption, the past caretaking standard
requires parents "to submit a parenting plan" for the future. 142 Further-
more, the past caretaking standard allows a continuum of allocation pos-
sibilities. 14 3 This standard may also be rebutted by certain factors such as
any prior agreement between the parents, the child's preferences, desire
to keep siblings together, potential harm to the welfare of the child, harm
due to emotional attachment to either parent, parental relocation issues,
and the need to avoid any impractical custodial arrangements that inter-
fere with the child's stability.
144
134. See Kelly & Ward, supra note 123, at 352 (stating that the best interest theory
creates uncertainty).
135. Id. See generally A.L.I, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, (Tentative Draft No. 3 (1998) (referring to the care-
taking standard as the "approximation rule").
136. Kelly & Ward, supra note 123 at 351.
137. Id. at 352.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 353.
141. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 19, at 807.
142. Id. at 806.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 807.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Holley is an improvement from the paternal preference and tender
years doctrine. Nevertheless, application of Holley in the child custody
arena poses problems. The following substantive and procedural sugges-
tions should help to ameliorate the problems.
A. Different Standards for Different Contexts
The starting point for arriving at an appropriate best interest standard
for child custody is to recognize that different contexts require different
standards. Holley may be appropriate for parental rights termination
cases, but it is inappropriate in the child custody context. The legislature
has already customized the best interest factors in at least one context.
145
Section 263.307 of the Texas Family Code lists thirteen factors the court
should consider before returning a child, who has been taken into state
custody, to their parent. 4 6 In this statute, the factors are targeted specifi-
cally to deal with the issue before the court.14 7 Either the Texas legisla-
ture or the judiciary should create a similar list in the child custody
context.
B. Parental Input
Texas courts should be required to consider a parent's wishes regarding
their child's best interest. Without considering this factor, Texas courts
are not addressing the presumption that a parent acts in the best interest
of the child. 48 Furthermore, it does not comply with the holding in
Troxel that a parent's wishes as to their child's best interest must be con-
sidered by the court.1 4 9 This particular recommendation appears to fly in
the face of the purpose and focus of this comment, that promoting the
best interest of the child, and not the parents' interests, is what courts
should strive to achieve. This recommendation does not detract from
that focus. Instead, recognizing parents' wishes merely compliments the
goal of achieving a child's best interest while satisfying constitutional re-
quirements. A parent's wish as to their child's best interest should be
145. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307 (Vernon 2002).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131 (Vernon 2002) (stating the presumption
that appointing parents as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of the child).
149. See Linder v. Linder, 72 S.W.3d 841, 856-57 (Ark. 2002) (noting that a statute
that does not accord weight to a parent's decision as to what is in their child's best interest
is in contravention of Troxel). See also Sleater v. Sleater, 42 S.W.3d 821, 823 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001) (stating that a parent's wishes as to a child's custody are relevant, though not
binding).
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another factor recognized by the court and accorded some weight, but it
should not be the determining factor.
C. Address Rationale
Procedural changes in the way Texas courts arrive at a child's best in-
terest should also be considered. One such procedural change is to re-
quire presiding judges to address each and every factor. In Fulk v.
Fulk,15 ° the Mississippi Court of Appeals held that the chancellor com-
mitted reversible error by failing to address and analyze each factor.15'
The Court explained that requiring a chancellor to address each factor
lends clarity to the chancellor's decision-making process, thus making an
appellate review more meaningful. 52 Implementing such a requirement
only assures that the subjective nature of the Holley best interest stan-
dard is curtailed. Furthermore, by analyzing and addressing each factor,
a court will ensure that it is being thorough in its search for the best inter-
est of the child.
D. Provide Rationale
In addition to addressing each and every factor, a court should also be
required to "give sufficient findings as to why" it arrived at the conclu-
sions it did.' 53 As the Mississippi Court of Appeals stated in Fulk,
"[s]imply dictating that the father was favored without explaining why he
was favored is not enough."' 54 The appellate court recognized that their
duty to review the chancellor's decision becomes futile when no rationale
for a chancellor's decision is present.155 Requiring courts to provide a
valid and unbiased explanation as to their best interest determination
would reduce the subjective nature inherent in the Holley best interest
standard.
E. Proposed Factors
Combining factors from the various standards developed in child cus-
tody cases, this comment proposes the following factors for Texas courts
to consider in making a best interest determination in child custody cases:
150. 827 So. 2d 736 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
151. See id. at 739. Mississippi courts have their own set of factors, the Albright fac-
tors, that they use when deciding a child's best interest in custody cases. See Albright v.
Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983) (enumerating the factors to be considered in
deciding where to place a child after custody disputes).
152. Fulk, 827 So. 2d at 739.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 740.
155. Id. (citing Powell v. Ayars, 792 So. 2d 240, 244 (Miss. 2001)).
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1) age and health of the child;
2) emotional and physical danger to the child;
3) emotional ties between the parents and the child;
4) primary caretaker prior to separation;
5) parenting skills of both parents;
6) stability of the home;
7) parents' wishes as to the child's custody;
8) interrelationship of the child with his parents, siblings, and any
other individual who significantly affects the child's best interest and
9) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
VII. CONCLUSION
A child's best interest in Texas continues to be determined by the fac-
tors enumerated in Holley.156 As such, parents who find themselves in
child custody disputes are likely to remain subject to the wide judicial
discretion accorded under such a standard.' 57 Different standards should
be adopted for the different contexts in which a child's interests are at
stake.158 In sum, while the Holley factors should not be discarded from
the child custody context, the Holley best interest standard should be
both substantively and procedurally targeted to the child custody context.
156. E.g., In re D.G., No. 04-02-00893-CV, at "1 2003 WL 22489643 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio, Nov. 5, 2003, no pet. hist.); In re R.F., 115 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003,
no pet. hist.).
157. See Vasterling, supra note 7, at 927 (claiming many commentators have criticized
the wide discretion this standard allots to judges); see also Rt. Hon. Dame Sian Elias, The
Family Court and Social Change, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 297, 302 (2002) (describing the wide
latitude judges have under the best interest standard as "dangerous").
158. E.g., In re C.E.H., 837 S.W.2d 947, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (adopting the forum
non conveniens standard and rejecting the best interest of the child theory in resolving a
transfer issue).
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